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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Home from home”—in point of regulation, this idiomatic expression is 
becoming an increasing reality for focal companies and their subordinates in 
multinational groups.1  Facing novel sustainability challenges posed by labor 
and environmental exploitation in the globalized business context, and with the 
power of multinational enterprises (MNE) greatly outpacing the growth of the 
international regulatory frameworks that control them,2 it is no longer unusual 
for a home state to fill governance gaps and hold a focal company responsible 
for activities in its supply chains beyond its national borders.3 
To take business and human rights as an example, in line with the current 
international regulatory framework and an overall expectation on home states as 
                                                                        
 1. In this article, the term “holding company” is used to denote a company created to buy 
and own the shares of other companies, which it then controls in a group context.  The term is 
often used interchangeably with the concept of “parent company.”  The term “focal company” 
refers to a business entity that governs the supply chain and has bargaining power over its business 
partners.  The latter may well include holding companies. 
 2. International law only recognizes individuals and states as possible perpetrators of certain 
human rights abuses, and does not accept private business defendants.  Uta Kohl, Corporate 
Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of Western Governments to the Alien Tort Statute, 
63(3) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 665, 670 (2014). 
 3. John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, at 7 (Apr. 
7, 2008).  “Governance gaps” associated with the expansion of globalized businesses are defined 
as “[the gap] between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences.”  Id. at 3.  See also Glen Whelan, Jeremy Moon 
& Marc Orlitzky, Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Embedded Liberalism: What 
Chance Consensus? 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 368 (2009) (discussing the rise of transnational 
corporations and their growing importance in global governance). 
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key performers/duty-bearers in human rights protection, two approaches 
currently form the polar extremes of a home state’s regulatory taxonomy, 
reflecting the ostensibly irreconcilable impasse between human rights advocacy 
groups and businesses.4  At one end of the spectrum is a hard law regime 
imposing substantive duties on corporations, with the 2003 United Nations 
(U.N.) Norms being a typical instance of this.5  Towards the other end lies the 
much softer U.N. “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, which defined the 
nature of businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights as a social norm 
“over and above compliance to laws and regulations,”6 different from the 2003 
“hard” duty recommendation.7  Despite the fact that the 2003 U.N. Norms 
suffered a dismal outcome in practice,8 this espousal of progressively hard laws 
to ensure that businesses uphold human rights has received a good deal of 
sympathy in a number of jurisdictions.  For instance, English law recently held 
that holding companies could owe some duty of care to sustainability victims 
harmed by their overseas subsidiaries, with the possibility of extending this wide 
accountability to related institutions in global supply chains.9  Meanwhile, there 
is also an assortment of international and national governance initiatives that 
embody the essence of the soft “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework.  
One prominent example is the latest version of Section 54 of the U.K. Modern 
Slavery Act (MSA), a supply chain disclosure requirement that “merely 
                                                                        
 4. John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights xvi–
xvii, 68, 76 (2013). 
 5. Economic and Social Council, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).  The U.N. Norms stipulate that transnational firms and other 
business enterprises have corresponding legal duties within their spheres of activity and influence, 
compliance be monitored by a rigid enforcement mechanism, and victims be provided with 
effective remedies.  Id. 15–18. 
 6. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” 
Framework, at 13, HR/Pub/11/04. 
 7. Economic and Social Council, supra note 5, 1. 
 8. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 821 (2007) (discussing the business community’s fierce 
opposition to the Norms).  The U.N. Commission on Human Rights eventually declared that, 
although there were “useful elements and ideas,” the document was ultimately a “draft proposal 
[with] no legal standing.”  Id. 
 9. Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, [6], [136]–[37]; Infra notes 
58–76. 
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provide[s] statutory endorsement to existing voluntary CSR [Corporate Social 
Responsibility] initiatives and reporting, with no penalty for non-compliance.”10  
Practice has thus far brought to life a wide usage of both regulatory approaches, 
intensifying a need to examine their doctrinal and pragmatic compatibilities.  
This is the analysis to which this Paper turns. 
This Paper aims to utilize the corporate disclosure requirement enshrined in 
Section 54 of the U.K. MSA 11  as an example of latest home states’ soft 
corporate responsibility law-making efforts to foster business self-regulation, 
and to explore its interactions with other progressively hard law means with 
extraterritorial impacts.  While Section 54 of the MSA has thus far been under 
intensive scholarly spotlight, the existing literature has concentrated on the 
intrinsic doctrinal and conceptual features of this latest regulatory approach,12 
with its fits to the external regulatory and institutional environment explored far 
less to date.  Building upon and complementing existing research on social 
disclosure regulation, this Paper intends to fill the current literature void by 
investigating the regulatory interactions between Section 54 and recent common 
law developments on companies’ duty of care and extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
the institutional compatibility of Section 54 to the broad supply chain 
environment that it operates in, and the resulting impacts on the enforcement of 
Section 54. 
This consideration of the legal and institutional disruptions in the application 
of Section 54 of MSA is also one aspect of a much broader reappraisal of the 
regulatory paradigm of booming global outsourcing and transnational business 
activities. 13   Although globalization has, in the eyes of some, made the 
                                                                        
 10. Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, The Domestic Politics of Corporate 
Accountability Legislation: Struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act, SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
 11. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (U.K.). 
 12. See generally Rae Lindsay, Anna Kirkpatrick & Jo En Low, Hardly Soft Law: The 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Trend Towards Mandatory Corporate Reporting on Human 
Rights, 18(1) BUS. L. INT’L 29 (2017) (discussing the effectiveness of MSA’s substantive 
requirements, such as mandatory reporting); see also Shuangge Wen, The Cogs and Wheels of 
Reflexive Law: Business Disclosure Under the Modern Slavery Act, 43(3) J. L. & SOC’Y 327, 330 
(2016) (evaluating “the intrinsic worth” and the “doctrinal and potential functional limits” of § 54 
of the MSA). 
 13. A.  Claire  Cutler,  Critical  Reflections on  the  Westphalian  Assumptions  of 
International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133, 145 (2001). 
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Westphalian sovereignty belief somewhat archaic,14 it would not be right to 
simply assume that globalization erodes the frontiers of national sovereignty.  
As presented by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), diverse societies are still reasonably expected to have diverse 
interests and different capacities to discharge international law obligations.15  In 
the absence of a widely adopted international legal framework, national and 
regional regulation plays a particularly important role in responding to “the 
peaks and troughs in the international regulatory landscape,”16 with the field of 
business and human rights being a typical instance.  Up to the present, states 
remain the primary duty bearers of human rights.  Both horizontal (actions 
between private actors) and vertical (states’ violations of private actors’ rights) 
applications of international human rights law still depend heavily on the 
contextualization of domestic laws and regulations.17  Discussions of Section 
54 of the MSA and its interactions with other extraterritorial regulatory 
initiatives and institutional factors, additional to its significance in securing 
fundamental human rights in transnational business practice, thus also touch on 
the wider ramifications of supply chain management in the contemporary world, 
and even on the broad sustainability agenda underpinning all societies and 
economies.18 
In the meantime, delineating the detailed regulatory fabric of corporate 
responsibilities in relation to human rights within such a broad ambit, loosely 
                                                                        
 14. See id. at 145 (“[globalization] is affecting a shift in authority structures, recasting state 
and corporate authority and control”). 
 15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Social 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, iii (1999). 
 16. Ryan J. Turner, Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as 
Corporate Law’s New Frontier, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 188, 203 (2016). 
 17. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44(4) VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 935 (2004); U.N. 
Economic and Social Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with 
regard to Human Rights, 12 (Feb. 15, 2005). 
 18. E.g., P. Beske & S. Seuring, Putting Sustainability into Supply Chain Management, 19(3) 
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT.: AN INT’L J. 322, 322 (2014); Galit A Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global 
Supply Chains, 56 (2) HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 419 (2015); Steve John New, Modern Slavery and 
the Supply Chain: the Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility, U. OF OXFORD SAID BUS. SCH.  
1 (Aug. 2015), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5847/1/REVISED_MSSCaproofed1format.pdf.  
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defined as a corporation’s sphere of influence,19 is, to say the least, a difficult 
job for a home state.  Despite their mutual ambition of eradicating human rights 
abuses in MNEs operations, even a cursory look at the above-mentioned soft and 
hard regulatory initiatives reveals huge variations in their jurisprudence and 
institutional designs, reflecting a variety of distinct ideological and national-
contextual underpinnings; it also shows deep divisions surrounding the interests 
and preferences of stakeholders impacting and affected by relevant rule-
making. 20   A large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
skeptical of the merits of laissez-faire capitalism, expressed limited confidence 
in the effectiveness of soft CSR initiatives in improving corporate 
performance.21  Considerable doubt has since been thrown upon soft human 
rights initiatives, including those developed by MNEs, with the most critical 
voices even describing these business giants as modern day “leviathans.”22 
                                                                        
 19. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) Clarifying the Concepts 
of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, Report on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 8, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (The U.N. Global Compact asked the corporate participants to 
embrace, support, and enact within their sphere of influence principles relevant to human rights 
protection and promotion. A company’s sphere of influence may be interpreted as a set of 
concentric circles mapping out stakeholders in a company’s value chain, with company workplace 
at the core, moving outwards to supply chains, the market place, the community and the 
government). 
 20. See, e.g., LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10 (comparing the lawmaking process of the 
U.K. MSA with the Bribery Act, and concluding that the weak force of Section 54 of the MSA was 
largely due to industry actors’ less direct but successful opposition to public regulation, which was 
done by way of supporting statutory endorsement to existing voluntary CSR initiatives and 
reporting). 
 21. See Amnesty International, Submission to the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprises, (July 2008) 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/40000/ior800032010eng.pdf. (Amnesty 
International expressly gave support to extraterritorial hard law measures, believing they “can be 
developed to address [the] lacuna [of business and human rights.]”)  Much scholarly ink has also 
been spilled in the legal community, voicing similar concerns and suggesting the development of 
legally binding instruments regarding human rights violations.  See, e.g., Aurora Voiculescu, 
Human Rights and the New Corporate Accountability: Learning from Recent Developments in 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 87(S2) J. BUS. ETHICS 419, 422 (2009); Justine Nolan & Luke 
Taylor, Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in Search of a 
Remedy?, 87(S2) J. BUS. ETHICS 433, 436 (2009). 
 22. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Bruce Mazlish, LEVIATHANS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL 2 (CUP, 2005). 
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Despite substantial suspicion from NGOs, soft corporate responsibilities to 
“respect” human rights manage to obtain considerable support from influential 
members of the business community, including the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the International Organization of Employers, and the Business and 
Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD.23  At the time of this writing, the 
business community, scholars and NGOs have been far from speaking with one 
voice regarding the most suitable regulatory method to tackle business and 
human rights at the home state level.  This division has led to a simultaneous 
adoption of various regulatory means with extraterritorial reach.24  Resulting 
disparities in the levels of stringency of these different regulatory instruments 
further lead to reciprocal disturbance in their concurrent application, providing 
compelling reasons for thinking again about the issue of regulatory interaction 
and compatibilities. 
This Paper is therefore also set against the backdrop of an ongoing movement 
towards regulating MNEs by virtue of home state regulation, to see how 
transnational norms with the aim of promoting corporate accountability are 
being shaped and interacting with domestic legislative frameworks.  The 
argument will suggest that although recent U.K. extraterritorial regulation 
developments constitute a significant step forward in improving sustainability 
and human rights protection in global supply chains, in terms of both extending 
“hard law” protection to victims and strengthening corporate social 
responsibility efforts, they lack coherence in both logic and institutional design.  
Contradictions in their doctrinal underpinnings and disparities in their levels of 
stringency lead to reciprocal disruptions in application. 
To further clarify, it is not our aim to refute these regulatory endeavors to 
tackle business and human rights challenges, with whose fundamental premises 
and ideals we fully agree.  Rather, we intend to bring to light the doctrinal, 
contextual and practical difficulties faced by current home-state lawmaking 
endeavors, particularly in the form of supply chain disclosure regulation, in the 
hope of generating further insights into the complex but important issue of 
imposing human rights responsibilities on MNEs.  We thus hope to build a 
bridge between law and other disciplines involved in the study of supply chain 
                                                                        
 23. Whelan et al., supra note 3, at 377. 
 24. Id. at 376. 
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management, from which a valuable mutual discourse could ensue.  This will 
not only be of interest to policymakers, industry actors and anti-slavery activists 
who “have heralded this wave of legislation as a game-changer,”25 but also 
responds to mounting awareness and concerns among consumers, investors and 
other stakeholders. 
The Paper is structured as follows: Upon conclusion of this introductory Part 
I, Part II identifies the major approaches adopted by home states in responding 
to the regulatory challenges created by global outsourcing and MNEs’ activities.  
The U.K. is utilized as a primary example, with Section 54 of the MSA 
embodying CSR ideals and recent case law imposing a hard law duty of care 
upon holding corporations occupying the polar extremes of its extraterritorial 
regulatory taxonomy on business and human rights.  Part III discusses in detail 
the interactions between these regulatory means in the course of their 
implementation, as well as their likely disruptive effects on the enforcement of 
Section 54.  Part IV further highlights institutional impediments to the effective 
implementation of Section 54, implicating its restricted practical effects in 
increasing corporate transparency and eliminating modern slavery offences in 
global chains.  The discussions in Parts III and IV are supported by data-based 
evidence presented in Part V.  Part VI puts forward some suggestions for future 
regulatory reform. 
II.  Regulatory Challenges brought about by Global Outsourcing 
A.  Global Outsourcing and Resulting Discrepancies between the Corporate 
and Legal Worlds 
Global outsourcing—the practice of sub-contracting business to third parties 
in other countries 26 —has become a contemporary source of institutional 
innovation and operational transformation, rather than a mere means of price 
arbitrage.27  Typical players involve integrated MNEs in the form of group 
                                                                        
 25. LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10, at 2. 
 26. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 425. 
 27. 2016 Global Outsourcing Survey: Outsourcing Accelerates Forward, DELOITTE 
CONSULTING LLP (June 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/fi/Documents/technology/2016%20GOS%20Ex
ec%20Summary_Nordic.pdf. 
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companies and transnational contractual network enterprises.  While their 
global outsourcing activities significantly promote economic development and 
are seen as a trigger for the next industrial revolution,28 their power and control 
arrangements that defy territorial boundaries also pose novel challenges to 
existing frameworks of company law, which are predominantly state-based. 
Under conventional company law, the above-mentioned two ways by which 
MNEs manipulate capital boundaries reduce or eliminate the potential legal 
liabilities of the holding company or the focal company, which is legally isolated 
from other production units within the corporate group/network, owing to the 
domestic nature of corporate laws and the separate legal personality orthodoxy.29  
The difficulty of distributing legal responsibility on a corporate group basis, and 
the jurisdictional concern of the holding (or focal) company often being situated 
in a different jurisdiction from that in which the harm occurs, lead to 
accountability failures by these entities. 30   The burgeoning of outsourcing 
activities under the separate legal personality principle — the fundamental 
cornerstone of corporate law in almost every jurisdiction — while perhaps not 
intending to, thus practically serves the purpose of expanding MNE immunity 
from legal liability, concealing “the reality of economic integration of 
interdependence.”31  At the very least, integral corporate operations through 
external contractual relations with other companies, or through subsidiaries in 
modern supply chains, lead to transaction cost reductions as well as unjustifiable 
limits upon business entities’ legal responsibility. Templeman LJ remarked: 
English company law possesses some curious features, which may 
generate curious results.  A parent company may spawn a number of 
subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by the 
shareholders of the parent company.  If one of the subsidiary 
companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the runt of the litter 
and declines into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the parent 
                                                                        
 28. Alan S. Blinders, Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 
2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/offshoring-next-industrial-revolution. 
 29. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 21; Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1990] Ch. 
433 [535].  See also Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [36]–[37] (showing the 
reluctance of English courts to acknowledge “piercing the corporate veil” as a general doctrine of 
law). 
 30. Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of 
Economic Integration, 53(6) MOD. L. REV. 731, 734 (1990). 
 31. Id. at 742. 
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company and the other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy 
of the shareholders without any liability for the debts of the insolvent 
subsidiary.32 
B.  Economic Integration Complications in Supply Chains 
Viewed from an economic perspective, the variety of business integration 
forms further adds to the difficulty of imposing legal liability on transnational 
corporate players.  Conventional English law used to recognize ownership and 
resulting control as major forms of bonding between economically integrated 
organizations, on the basis of which they may be regarded as one group rather 
than separate individual entities for responsibility purposes.33  In the context of 
global supply chains, patterns of group company integration often exceed 
connections based upon ownership and follow-on control.  A typical pattern of 
integration is dynamically hierarchical, with a focal company surrounded by a 
number of satellites at various levels of trade, comprising both upstream 
suppliers and downstream distributors.34  In practice, this pattern of outsourcing 
activities has been constantly expanding, “ranging from product design to 
assembly, from research and development to marketing, distribution and after-
sales service.”35  As this pattern of core and periphery, which often ignores 
national boundaries, gradually stabilizes through the practice of repetitive 
contracting, a steady authority relation will be formed under the mantle of a 
MNE and its smaller overseas business partners.36 Such authority relations in 
supply chains are no longer necessarily tied to the same forms of ownership 
which are found in group companies.  As remarked by Collins, they may arise 
“wherever the economic dependence of one party upon the other effectively 
                                                                        
 32. Re Southard & Co. Ltd. [1979] 1 WLR 1198, 1208 (Templeman LJ). 
 33. Compare DHN Food Distrib. Ltd v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 
WLR 852; Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp. & Others v. Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333; Atlas Mar. 
v. Avalon Mar. (No.1) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, with Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1990] Ch. 433; 
VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek Int’l Corp. & Others [2013] UKSC 5; Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. 
[2013] UKSC 34 (placing DHN and similar judicial opinions on shaky ground). 
 34. Raja Kali & Javier Reyes, The Architecture of Globalization: A Network Approach to 
International Economic Integration, 38(4) J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 595, 595 (2007). 
 35. Gene. M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global Economy, 72 R. ECON. 
STUD. 135, 135 (2005). 
 36. Collins, supra note 30, at 743. 
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requires compliance with the dominant party’s wishes.”37  A major MNE may 
acquire sufficient leverage over a supplier in an emerging economy to be in a 
position to determine its business behavior in practice.  Its massive purchasing 
power, huge market share and the relatively competitive labor and product prices 
it can offer38 often bolster this authority.  From the perspective of institutional 
economics, these group organizations built upon contracts and authority are 
often stable, potentially even reaching the bonding status of quasi-firms in 
business reality, with individual units comprising distinct legal identities in 
law.39  However, from the legal perspective, it is difficult to treat such a group 
of business organizations as one unit, or hold a focal company liable for the 
conduct of its satellite companies, despite their close ties in business practice.  
Not least owing to this reason, the liability regime within a corporate group led 
by a focal corporation is regarded as “one of the great unsolved problems of 
modern company law.”40 
C.  Home State Regulatory Developments in Response to Global Outsourcing 
While conventional laws that construct “an atomistic conception of social 
relations”41 and delimit one’s legal responsibilities in relation to one’s own acts 
and omissions struggle to encompass the complex patterns of economic 
integration in the global ambit, novel attempts are increasingly being 
                                                                        
 37. Id. at 734.  Cf. Dani Rodrik, How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?, 
14(1) J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 179 (2000) (arguing that implicit contracts which are often embedded 
in domestic social networks are scarce in international contexts). 
 38. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1998: CHAPTER FOUR 
GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE 36 (1998). Compared to the labor and material costs in domestic 
markets, the labor and product prices in emerging economies are much more modest.  There is also 
evidence that various patterns of economic integration occur to take advantage of possible savings 
in this regard.  According to the World Trade Organization in 1998, the production of a particular 
American car generated only 37% of the production value in the United States, with the rest 
generated in various foreign countries, including Japan, Germany, Taiwan, the U.K., Ireland and 
Barbados. Id. This percentage is likely to be even lower in the future.  See also Collins, supra note 
30, at 733. 
 39. Robert G. Eccles, The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry, 2 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
335, 335 (1981); Collins, supra note 30, at 734.  This organizational form also to a large extent 
resembles the “inside contracting system” described by Williamson.  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 96 (1975). 
 40. Clive M. Schmitthoff, Banco Ambrosiano and Modern Company Law, J. BUS. L. 361, 363 
(1982). 
 41. Collins, supra note 30, at 731. 
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implemented in response to the challenges created by global outsourcing.42  
These so-called neo-evolutionary paths presuppose that conventional 
territorially-based law is static and ill-equipped for regulating rapidly changing 
and increasingly complex social spheres, 43  collectively calling for further 
differentiation of law into specialized areas of social ordering.  The artificiality 
of an entity’s domicile as a basis for regulation is increasingly recognized, and 
the reach of national legislation, particularly of home states in relation to their 
own business entities with operations in foreign jurisdictions, has been 
extending on the basis of business rather than territorial connections.44 
However, these home state regulatory initiatives are not necessarily 
integrated.  Taking the theme of business and human rights in the UK as an 
example, there are discrepancies between mandatory corporate accountability to 
protect human rights and voluntary corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, on the basis of which different regulatory means have evolved.  For 
instance, Section 54 of the U.K. MSA, which requires commercial organizations 
to disclose in their annual slavery statement, indicating whether they have made 
efforts to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in their 
global supply chains, and if so, requiring a statement of the detailed steps 
taken,45 could be seen as part of a pioneering attempt to advocate businesses’ 
soft responsibility to respect human rights, as proposed by the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights. 46   Its general aim is to invite 
multiple stakeholders in global supply chains to assume a regulatory role, setting 
standards and action protocols for human rights protection in their own 
corporations’ global supply chains.47  Towards this end, general norms are set 
in order to steer primary actors but simultaneously leave them with a substantial 
zone of freedom to engage in self-regulation; this is evidenced by Section 54 
leaving substantive discretion to corporate actors to determine their own 
                                                                        
 42. Id.  See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 239, 239–40 (1983) (discussing new evolutionary theories about law). 
 43. Teubner, id., at 274. 
 44. Turner, supra note 16, at 192. 
 45. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(4). 
 46. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 6, at 13. 
 47. Dara O’Rourke, Multi-Stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing Global Labour 
Standards?, 34(5) WORLD DEV. 899, 900 (2006). 
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business undertakings, including the extent and ways in which they control 
modern slavery in the course of their operations.48 
On the other hand, hard-law duties are inclining in the other direction, towards 
imposing substantive liabilities upon a holding/focal company where necessary, 
so as to “leave the realm of voluntary corporate responsibility for the one of pure 
accountability.”49  For instance, a number of recent case judgments in the U.K. 
hold that a holding company might be held directly responsible if shown to be 
itself at fault for sustainability or human rights violations committed by a 
subsidiary, without affecting the company law cornerstone of separate legal 
personality.50  In the context of global supply chains, this arguably makes it 
possible to hold a focal firm liable for overseas activities of a subsidiary, or 
another member of the same multinational group of companies which is in the 
downstream of a supply chain. 
As will be discussed below, while these two distinct regulatory approaches 
have a mutual aim of enhancing human rights protection in their home 
corporations’ global ambit of influence, they lack logical and implementational 
coherence to “defeat the power of capital to organize itself in ways which reduce 
or eliminate liabilities arising from productive activities.”51  This calls for a 
more systematic treatment of the limits of legal responsibility by reference to the 
boundaries of capital units. 
III.  REGULATORY INTERACTION AND DISRUPTIONS TO SUPPLY CHAIN 
DISCLOSURE 
The latest legal developments in supply chain transparency and benchmarking 
initiatives, represented by Section 54 of the U.K. MSA, offer a novel solution to 
the capital boundary problem.  Section 54 captures the idea of integral 
economic control which binds a group of companies together, without rendering 
the concept of legal entity useless.  One primary legislative aim of this type of 
                                                                        
 48. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103(2) COLUM. L. REV. 384, 384 (2003); 
Wen, supra note 12, at 347–49. 
 49. Ramona Elisabeta Cirlig, Business and Human Rights: From Soft Law to Hard Law?, 6(2) 
JURID. TRIB. 228, 228 (2016). 
 50. The most notable is Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [78]–[79].  See also 
infra notes 58–76 and relevant texts. 
 51. Collins, supra note 30, at 738. 
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supply chain disclosure laws, as identified by Galit Sarfaty, is to “deploy . . . 
multinational companies to regulate themselves and indirectly regulate other 
firms in their supply chain.”52  On October 4, 2017, the U.K. Government 
released Updated Guidance on the corporate reporting obligation in the MSA, 
which is fully demonstrative of the ‘best practice’ approach represented by 
Section 54, i.e., encouraging rather than obligating companies to produce more 
detailed and practical MSA statements.53 
Laudable legislative intent notwithstanding, it appears that the construction of 
Section 54 is based upon two premises, which are both, to a large extent, 
assumptions.  First, as noted in Justice Brandeis’ famous line “Sunshine is the 
best of disinfectants,”54 lawmakers believe that it will be more difficult for 
commercial organizations to deny their own guilt or overlook their own idleness 
if they openly disclose their affairs and place them under market and public 
scrutiny, thereby obliquely facilitating the enhancement of human rights 
protection at the institutional level.55  Second, there is also an inherent belief 
that businesses would be incentivized to disclose their efforts to combat modern 
slavery, as this information would demonstrate their proactive efforts to 
eradicate this social ill and thereby generate more reputation-related benefits.56 
Leaving aside the first assumption, which is outside the scope of this Paper, it 
is possible to take issue with the second assumption.  When information about 
combating modern slavery in a group context might lead to civil claims for 
reparation, or even claims on criminal grounds, it is hard to imagine that any 
business would accept this risk and make a full disclosure.  Taking into 
                                                                        
 52. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 435. 
 53. Wen, supra note 12, at 349. 
 54. Louis D. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914, 
reprinted by Martino Fine Books, 2009). 
 55. As in the words of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the former California State Governor, when 
promoting the California Transparency in Supply Chain Act: “This will increase transparency, 
allow consumers to get more information and make more choices and motivate businesses to ensure 
humane practices. . . . Of course this is not a silver bullet, by any means, but what it does is, it really 
makes government and businesses work together.”  Governor Highlights Legislation to Combat 
Human Trafficking (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16215. 
 56. See, e.g., House of Commons Committee Debate First Sitting: The Modern Slavery Bill, 
(July 21, 2014) (statement of Andrew Wallis, CEO of Unseen U.K.) (“Fundamentally, [the 
requirement of slavery disclosure statement] should be viewed not as red tape but as a measure to 
protect British business.”). 
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consideration recent common law developments on corporations’ tort liability in 
the context of group companies, such risks may well turn into reality.  In respect 
of tortious liability, English courts have recognized that the modern degree of 
economic integration merits the adoption of a more flexible approach to 
territorial jurisdiction and even group responsibility, using a pattern of authority 
and domination to overcome the capital boundary problem. 57   As will be 
examined below, this separation from the conventional requirement of direct 
ownership opens up the possibility of charging liabilities not only in parent-
subsidiary relations but also between companies without direct share ownership 
links, which are often observed in supply chain contexts. 
A.  Potential Tort Liability for Focal Companies in Global Supply Chains 
Distinguishing territory from jurisdiction is not completely new under English 
law.  As evidenced in the trajectory of tort liability for focal companies, it began 
with Lubbe and Others v. Cape PLC,58 and reached maturity in Chandler v. 
Cape.59  The claimant, Mr. Chandler, was employed by Cape Building Products 
Ltd, a subsidiary of the defendant company Cape PLC (hereinafter Cape).  The 
claimant, who worked in a factory with open sides, which emitted dust, 
contracted asbestosis fifty years later.60  Both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal supported Mr. Chandler’s claim that there was a duty of care on the part 
of Cape to the employees of the subsidiary company to advise on, or to ensure, 
a safe system of work for them, on the basis of an assumption of responsibility 
derived from the Caparo judgment.61  Given (1) that the business of the holding 
                                                                        
 57. See Collins, supra note 30, at 734. 
 58. Lubbe & Others v. Cape PLC [2000] 1 WLR 1545.  On the other hand, the general 
principles that determine whether A owes a duty of care to C in respect of the harmful activities of 
B can be traced back as far as the House of Lords’ decision in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home 
Office [1970] AC 1004.  Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, at [46]–[56] 
(Lord Briggs). 
 59. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525. 
 60. Id. at [1], [3]. 
 61. Id. at 32, [72]–[81]; see also Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 617–8 
(Lord Bridge) (stating the three ingredients for determining whether a situation gives rise to a duty 
of care include that the damage should be foreseeable, that there should exist a relationship of 
proximity between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed, and that the situation 
should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of a given 
scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other). 
140 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69:125 
company and subsidiary are in all relevant aspects the same; (2) the state of 
Cape’s knowledge about the subsidiary’s work; (3) Cape’s superior knowledge 
of the nature and management of asbestos risks, and; (4) that Cape knew, or 
ought to have foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on it 
using its superior knowledge for the employees’ protection,62 it was held that 
the claimant had established a sufficient degree of proximity to the defendant 
company for it to be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on Cape 
to protect the claimant from harm from asbestos in the atmosphere. 63   In 
particular, the Court of Appeal emphasized that it was not necessary to show 
that the holding company was in the habit of intervening in the health and safety 
policies of the subsidiary; evidence showing “that the parent has a practice of 
intervening in the trading operations of the subsidiary, for example production 
and funding issues” would suffice for the purpose of (4).64 
Although Chandler is often seen as “a source of inspiration” for the imposition 
of a duty of care on the focal company of a multinational for the health and safety 
of employees and others affected by the acts and omissions of an overseas 
subsidiary,65 it is worth pointing out that the imposition of such a duty of care 
does not involve “a novel and controversial extension of the boundaries of the 
tort of negligence, beyond any established category.”66  Instead, this has been 
                                                                        
 62. See Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, at [75] (finding the test was satisfied on the basis 
that throughout the claimant’s employment period Cape had employed a group medical advisor and 
a scientific officer in seeking ways of suppressing asbestos dust, and many aspects of the 
subsidiary’s production process had been discussed and authorized by the defendant’s board). 
 63. Id. at [80] (Arden LJ). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ugljesa Grusic, Responsibilities in Groups of Companies and the Future of International 
Human Rights and Environmental Litigation, 74(1) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 30, 32–33 (2015). 
 66. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [46] (Lord Briggs).  The 
court stated 
the liability of parent companies in relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is not, of 
itself, a distinct category of liability in common law negligence.  Direct or indirect 
ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another company (which 
is the irreducible essence of a parent/subsidiary relationship) may enable the parent to 
take control of the management of the operations of the business or of land owned by the 
subsidiary, but it does not impose any duty upon the parent to do so, whether owed to the 
subsidiary or, a fortiori, to anyone else.  Everything depends on the extent to which, and 
the way in which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, 
control, supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations (including land 
use) of the subsidiary. 
Id. at [49].  The court also noted 
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realized by the courts’ elastic interpretation of proximity in business relations.  
As Arden LJ stated, “the development of the law of negligence has to be 
incremental.” 67   The conceptual elasticity of “proximity” has already been 
explicitly acknowledged on several occasions in English law. As Lord Oliver 
pointed out in Caparo: “‘Proximity’ … embraces not a definable concept but 
merely a description of circumstances in which, pragmatically, the courts 
conclude that a duty of care exists.” 68   In Chandler, the Court of Appeal 
explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument that “the duty of care can only exist 
if the parent company has absolute control of the subsidiary,”69 implying the 
enlarged scope of the duty and the far-reaching potential of the Caparo test.70  
The possibility of a wider scope for the imposition of the duty of care within a 
multinational group of companies, within which “there is no limit to the models 
of management and control,”71  was further reaffirmed by Tomlinson LJ in 
David Thompson v. The Renwick Group PLC,72 where he stipulated that “[i]t is 
clear that Arden LJ intended this formulation to be descriptive of circumstances 
in which a duty might be imposed rather than exhaustive of the circumstances 
in which a duty may be imposed.”73 
                                                                        
[t]here is no special doctrine in the law of tort of legal responsibility on the part of a 
parent company in relation to the activities of its subsidiary, vis-a-vis persons affected 
by those activities….  The legal principles are the same as would apply in relation to the 
question whether any third party (such as a consultant giving advice to the subsidiary) 
was subject to a duty of care in tort owed to a claimant dealing with the subsidiary. 
Id. at [50] (quoting AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532, [36] (Sales LJ) (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
 67. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [63] (Arden LJ) (appeal taken from Eng. 
& Wales). 
 68. Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 633 (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton) 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
 69. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, at [66]. 
 70. See id. at [67], [70] (“[i]t is simply not possible to say in all cases what is or is not a normal 
incident of that relationship….  The question is simply whether what the … company did 
amounted to taking on a direct duty [of care.]”). 
 71. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [51] (Lord Briggs SCJ) 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
 72. Thomson v. Renwick Grp. PLC [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [33] (Tomlinson LJ).  The 
claimant’s claim was only rejected in this case on the grounds that the holding company did not 
carry on any business at all apart from holding shares in other companies, and that there was no 
evidence that the holding company either did have or should have had any knowledge of the risk 
superior to that which the subsidiaries could be expected to have.  Id. at [38]. 
 73. Id. at [33]. 
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The legitimate provenance of finding a focal company liable in tort for its 
subsidiaries, who may well be its suppliers in a global supply chain, is further 
extended by the Vedanta judgment.74  In a judgment that was subsequently 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal stipulated in this case that 
a U.K. holding company’s duty of care may, in certain circumstances, extend 
not only to employees of a subsidiary but also to third parties affected by a 
subsidiary’s operations, including subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.75  
Although it remains to be seen how these claims will be determined on their 
merits, the fact that there had never been a reported case in this regard clearly 
did not make such a claim unarguable.76 
B.  Regulatory Interactions between Tortious Liabilities of the Focal 
Company and Supply Chain Disclosure 
While the liability arising from common law negligence has only been 
successfully applied thus far to holding companies in relation to their 
subsidiaries’ health and safety offenses, this is significant enough to cause 
disruption in the enforcement of Section 54, given that group companies are a 
common pattern in global outsourcing.  The Caparo ascription of responsibility 
application would also likely have significant implications for supply chain 
management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of agency and 
collateral contracts.  In particular, the three-part Caparo test of foreseeability, 
proximity and reasonableness, which is used in affirming the assumption of 
responsibility, could equally apply to supply chain relationships, particularly in 
big MNEs which have power and “a practice of intervening in the trading 
operations”77 of their trading partners within supply chains.78  Section 54 of the 
MSA suggests that a qualifying corporation should disclose information on “the 
                                                                        
 74. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [52]–[62]. 
 75. Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [83] (Simon LJ) (appeal taken 
from Eng. & Wales). 
 76. See id. at [88] (“If it were otherwise the law would never change.”). 
 77. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Arden LJ) (appeal taken from Eng. 
& Wales). 
 78. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [49] (provided that between these trading partners there 
exists direct or indirect ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another 
company). 
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organization’s structure, its business and its supply chains”79 and “the parts of 
its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human 
trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that 
risk.” 80   This disclosure conveniently would constitute direct evidence for 
potential claimants against the focal company in proving foreseeability and 
proximity, given that the suppliers, under repetitive contracts with and the 
authority of the focal company, will also likely rely upon the focal company 
deploying its superior knowledge or expertise in avoiding modern slavery.81 
The evidential significance of sustainability reports published by 
corporations, including reports involving modern slavery information, in 
establishing proximity and reasonableness was clearly stipulated by Lord 
Bingham in Lubbe.82  As mentioned, the main issue of determining the liability 
of a parent company involves the control that it exercises over and the advice it 
gives to its subsidiary company.  Much of the evidence presented to any such 
inquiry would, in the ordinary way, “be documentary and much of it would be 
found in the offices of the parent company, including minutes of meetings, 
reports by directors and employees on visits overseas and correspondence.”83  
Considering the four factors that the Court of Appeal explicated in Chandler, 
one would expect that the last three of the required elements, including the 
parent’s superior knowledge of the risk, are all likely to be satisfied if the parent 
corporation provides details about “the parts of its business and supply chains 
where there is a risk of slavery and human trafficking taking place, and the steps 
it has taken to assess and manage that risk” as required by Section 54 of the 
MSA.84 
Practice has already seen real reparation claims following corporations’ 
modern slavery disclosures.  A recent class action suit was filed by a consumer 
against the U.S. retailing giant Costco and several of its suppliers, claiming that 
the presence of forced labor in its seafood supply chain is contradictory to the 
                                                                        
 79. U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5). 
 80. Id. § 54(5)(d). 
 81. See supra notes 33–40 (discussing the authority of a focal firm in supply chain contexts). 
 82. Lubbe & Others v. Cape PLC, [2000] 1 WLR 1545 [20]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5). 
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statements made under the provisions of the Supply Chain Transparency Act.85  
A similar class action suit was also brought against Nestlé.86   Under such 
circumstances, the realization of the legislative intent of supply chain disclosure 
regulation is likely to be disrupted, and corporations’ incentives to disclose 
comprehensive and extensive information would be reduced; when a detailed 
disclosure of supply chain management and control of modern slavery might 
potentially lead to direct liability in supply chains, it is predictable that focal 
companies subject to Section 54 will be tempted to make a tick-the-box 
disclosure only, or even simply deny any action on or knowledge of modern 
slavery in their supply chains.  In both cases they will have fulfilled their 
statutory duty of disclosure as a commercial organization, and will be regarded 
as having properly disclosed under Section 54 by simply stating that they have 
taken no relevant action during the financial year.87  Given the additional risk 
of reputational damage, commercial organizations and people who are “the 
directing mind and will” of these companies88 will, at the very least, be cautious 
about what to disclose when the information might be used as evidence, thereby 
putting themselves at future risk.  As stated by New, “Forced labor is an issue 
of such legal gravity that continued, knowing engagement could constitute direct 
complicity in criminal behavior, a much more serious situation for the firm than 
‘mere’ reputational damage.” 89   One may thus see potentially perverse 
incentives for corporations “not to regulate their supply chains . . . for fear of 
generating the factum for a cause of action in tort,” although as a matter of policy 
                                                                        
 85. See Sarah K. Rathke et al., Litigation Fallout from All This Supply Chain Transparency 
Legislation (or, These Things Have Teeth!) (or, The Cycle of Misfortune), NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 26, 
2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-fallout-all-supply-chain-transparency-
legislation-or-these-things-have (noting that the class action suit, Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), “may be the first 
lawsuit of its kind, [but] it certainly won’t be the last.”). 
 86. Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015).  Neither Sud nor 
Barber made substantive headway as  both  claims  were  dismissed  by  the  trial  courts.  
Sud,  2016  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  5524, re-filing dismissed, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 
2017), aff’d, 731 Fed. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018); Barber 154 S. Supp. 3d 954, aff’d, 730 Fed. 
App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 87. U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(4)(b). 
 88. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 171 (appeal taken from Eng. & 
Wales) (establishing a theory of corporate liability in which certain people, such as directors and 
superior officers, represent companies’ directing mind and will). 
 89. New, supra note 18, at 4. 
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the law does not intend to encourage such willful passiveness among 
corporations.90 
C.  Developments on Cross-Border Corporate Sustainability and the 
Evidential Implications of Supply Chain Disclosure 
1.  The Evidential Value of Corporate Disclosure Documents 
A number of recent case judgments,91 in particular Vedanta Resources PLC 
and Another v. Lungowe92 and Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC,93 further 
consolidate the significant evidential effect of public documents on cross-border 
corporate sustainability.  These cases currently concern the establishment of 
jurisdiction only: overseas claimants, as third parties allegedly harmed by a 
subsidiary’s local operations, are trying to establish the English courts’ 
jurisdiction to try claims against parent companies and their overseas 
subsidiaries.94  However, these jurisdiction claims merit an examination of the 
substance of the case, and thereby require consideration of whether there was 
some plausible case between the overseas claimants and the holding company,95 
involving a purportedly simple question of law that Chandler was trying to 
solve: whether an English parent company owes a duty of care to those affected 
by a subsidiary’s overseas operations.96 
                                                                        
 90. Turner, supra note 16, at 197. 
 91. See, e.g., AAA & Others v. Unilever PLC & Anor [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532.  Regardless 
of the High Court Judge Elisabeth Laing J’s decision that there was a sufficient degree of proximity 
and although there was inadequate foreseeability or reasonableness to establish viable claims 
against Unilever, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the appeal should be dismissed by 
reason of the proximity point in relation to Unilever, and it is pointless to consider issues of 
foreseeability and reasonableness in terms of the imposition of a duty of care.  The Court of Appeal 
found insufficient detail in the record regarding the English company’s guidance and advice to the 
subsidiary to establish proximity.  Id. at [15]. 
 92. Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Lord Briggs, unanimous decision) 
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
 93. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 (Eng. & Wales). 
 94. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [3]–[4]; Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [196]. 
 95. See, e.g., Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, [63] (Simon LJ) (“In 
general, a real issue between the relevant parties is to be equated with a properly arguable case or 
serious question to be tried . . . The more doubtful the point of law, the more cautious the court 
should be, since the question of law goes to the existence of the jurisdiction.”). 
 96. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525; Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 
2 AC 605 (HL) 609 (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).  Such a duty 
of care may arise where the parent company: (a) has taken direct responsibility for devising a 
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In both Vedanta and Okpabi the claimants relied on the sustainability reports 
disclosed by the defendants, implicating the potential evidential effects of the 
modern slavery reports required by Section 54 in establishing the human rights 
liabilities of parent corporations.97  For instance, in Vedanta the report issued 
by the Vedanta company, entitled “Embedding Sustainability,” contained 
information about the board of Vedanta exercising oversight of all Vedanta’s 
subsidiaries, and referred to problems with discharges into water as an 
example. 98   There were also highlights in Vedanta’s public statements 
regarding its commitment to address environmental risks and technical 
shortcomings in the subsidiary’s mining infrastructure.99  These are the kind of 
standardized statements that one often finds in corporate reports on sustainability 
issues — for instance, the statement that “we have a governance framework to 
ensure that surface and ground water do not get contaminated by our 
operations.”100  However, they were relied upon by the plaintiff and the courts, 
in support of a well arguable case that the parent company Vedanta had either 
taken direct responsibility or had controlled the operations which had given rise 
to the claim.101  As stipulated by Lord Briggs, with whom other Supreme Court 
judges agreed, there does not exist a general principle that a parent could never 
incur a duty of care in respect of the activities of a particular subsidiary merely 
                                                                        
material health and safety policy; or (b) controls the operations which give rise to the claim.  In 
these cases the Court of Appeal used the three-part formulation (foreseeability, proximity, and 
reasonableness) set out by the House of Lords in Caparo, to see whether a properly arguable claim 
that a duty of care was owed in the particular case could be established.  Id. 
 97. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [8]; Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [43]. 
 98. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [58]; Vedanta [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, at [84]. 
 99. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [55]. 
 100. Vedanta [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, at [84]. 
 101. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [61] (Lord Briggs). The Court stated 
I regard the published materials in which Vedanta may fairly be said to have asserted its 
own assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of proper standards of 
environmental control over the activities of its subsidiaries, and in particular the 
operations at the Mine, and not merely to have laid down but also implemented those 
standards by training, monitoring and enforcement, as sufficient on their own to show 
that it is well arguable that a sufficient level of intervention by Vedanta in the conduct of 
operations at the Mine may be demonstrable at trial, after full disclosure of the relevant 
internal documents of Vedanta and KCM and of communications passing between them. 
See also id. at [84]–[90] (Simon LJ). 
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by laying down group-wide policies and guidelines, and expecting the 
management of each subsidiary to comply with them.102 
Likewise, in Okpabi the claimants relied on the contents of several 
Sustainability Reports published by the defendant company, highlighting the 
commitment of the parent company to control and direct the subsidiary’s 
environmental performance. 103   Although the Court of Appeal rejected the 
claimants’ argument by a 2–1 majority, the evidential value of public reports 
issued by the defendant company was explicitly acknowledged by all appellate 
judges.104  Simon LJ, who was among the majority, emphasized that he “would 
accept that statements made in the … Sustainability Report were particularly 
relevant to the existence of the duty of care relied on by the claimants.”105  
Likewise, Sir Geoffrey Vos opined that the regulatory text (that puts forward 
disclosure standards) means that such statements “are more likely to be true, and 
so should be accorded greater evidential weight.”106 
Furthermore, as evidenced in Okpabi, it still remains debatable as to the extent 
to which the disclosed information would be deemed specific enough to 
establish proximity between the entities, and the evidential value of corporate 
disclosure, including modern slavery reports, in establishing the focal 
company’s duty of care might turn out to be even more significant.107  For 
instance, based on exactly the same facts on which Simon LJ and Sir Geoffrey 
Vos rejected the appeal, Sales LJ adopted a more contextual approach when 
                                                                        
 102. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [52]–[53] (Lord Briggs) (giving two examples in which 
the parent would be held liable in respect of the activities of one of its subsidiaries by laying down 
group-wide policies and expecting the subsidiaries to comply: if the unsafe system of work had 
formed part of a group-wide policy publicized by the parent, which had been applied by subsidiaries 
around the world; or if the parent claims in published materials to exercise a sufficient degree of 
supervision and control of its subsidiaries, but it does not in fact do so.). 
 103. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [153], [163]. 
 104. Id. at [163]. 
 105. Id. at [67] (Simon LJ). 
 106. Id. at [188] (Sir Geoffrey Vos).  These two judges only declined to allow the claim 
because they felt the disclosed corporate policies and documents were not specifically targeting the 
subsidiary company, and thus only showed that a parent company had taken steps to ensure that 
there were proper control mechanisms in place over all subsidiaries.  Nevertheless, there might be 
an arguable case if relevant corporate policies and processes were more specific, demonstrating the 
parent’s endeavors to exercise control over a particular subsidiary.  Id. 
 107. Id. at [2]–[4]. 
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considering the issue of proximity and was in favor of allowing an appeal:108 “ 
. . . on the facts of a particular case, the issuing of mandatory instructions 
combined with close monitoring, intervention and enforcement, may show that 
there has been a material assumption of responsibility.” 109   In Sales LJ’s 
opinion in Okpabi, the group-wide instructions issued by RDS provided a 
practical means for RDS to disseminate expertise and to control at least some 
aspects of the management of its operating companies, which helped the 
claimants to assert an arguable claim that RDS assumed a material degree of 
responsibility in relation to the management of the pipeline and facilities 
according to the criteria in Chandler and Vedanta.110  In particular, the fact that 
the losses due to oil spillage in Nigeria were singled out in the Shell 
Sustainability Report 2014 was construed as strong evidence that the parent “had 
a particularly strong interest in ensuring that the management of the pipeline and 
facilities was conducted effectively and thus was proactive in assuming control 
of the operational decisions about how to manage the risk of oil and spillage 
from them.”111 
2.  Extended Corporate Proximity from Ownership to Authority 
In the Vedanta case, the subsidiary company, KCM, was not a 100% 
subsidiary of Vedanta. 112   However, based on the materials published by 
Vedanta, it was not difficult for the courts to find that Vedanta’s ultimate control 
of KCM was “not to be regarded as any less than it would be if wholly 
owned.”113  The Okpabi judgment went even further, stipulating that the fact 
that the parent company did not directly hold shares in the subsidiary was 
irrelevant in establishing the duty of care of the parent company, since the parent 
could still exert practical control over the subsidiary.114  These are explicit signs 
of English courts starting to depart from the conventional emphasis on 
                                                                        
 108. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [31]–[32]. 
 109. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [172] (Sales LJ). 
 110. Id. at [171]. 
 111. Id. at [162]. 
 112. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [2] (Lord Briggs) (appeal 
taken from Eng. & Wales). 
 113. Id. at [2]. 
 114. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [172] (Sales LJ). 
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ownership in groups towards authority when establishing proximity, and 
focusing more on whether the group is managed integrally along functional 
lines.  For instance, the existence of global standards within a company group 
was considered by Sales LJ in Okpabi as capable of providing a mechanism for 
the projection of real practical executive control by the parent’s CEO and key 
organs over the affairs of the subsidiary, if they wished to assume such 
control.115  This is an additional warning sign to corporations operating using 
forms of authority bonding, which often occurs in supply chains.  Predictably, 
the evidential value of public information disclosed by the company in 
establishing a holding company’s duty of care largely remains a matter of 
detailed factual analysis, which will only make MNEs more careful in choosing 
and formulating their methods and the content of their disclosure, thereby largely 
thwarting the legislative purpose of Section 54. 
This area of law is far from being consolidated, since the claimants in Okpabi 
are seeking to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Vedanta case remains to be 
judged on its merits.116  In the meantime, however, based on existing case 
judgments it seems that the more a company becomes involved in the control 
and publication of information about its overseas connected companies’ 
operations, the more likely it is to be plunged into litigation and held liable for 
negligence by overseas subsidiaries and companies connected through supply 
contracts.  Thus far, connections acknowledged by judicial authorities have 
been confined to those between parents and subsidiaries, but this type of parent-
subsidiary connection often exists in supply chains, if it is possible to 
demonstrate the necessary degree of foreseeability, proximity and 
reasonableness.117 
                                                                        
 115. Id. at [161]. 
 116. Chris Owen & Adam Bristow, Okpabi v. Shell Appeal Highlights Important Points 
Regarding Parent Co. Liability, ELEXICA (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-
topics/dispute-resolution-commercial/260218-okpabi-v-shell. 
 117. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [24] (Simon LJ).  “It is clear that the three-part test 
set out in the Caparo case is not a forensic equation to which values may be attached that yield the 
answer to whether or not a duty is owed.”  Id. 
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3.  The Enforcement Tension between the Extraterritorial Duty of Care and 
Supply Chain Disclosure 
A significant tension is therefore evident in the trajectory of the latest case 
law developments: MNEs in general, and particularly under supply chain 
disclosure regulation, are encouraged to construct and implement measures to 
prevent their suppliers/subsidiaries from engaging in human rights abuses.118  
However, there also exists a risk that the imposition and enforcement of such 
measures could be construed as the focal companies’ control of and/or 
acceptance of responsibility for the operations of that subsidiary/supplier.119  
Existing laws on the duty of care for parent corporations place significant 
emphasis on the nature of the working relationships between business entities, 
in which documentary evidence issued by the entities plays an important role.  
In this regard, Vedanta and Okpabi provided clear examples of how detailed 
sustainability disclosure can backfire; the evidence, in which sustainability 
reports played a key part, was considered to support the case that “there was a 
pattern of distribution of expertise and control in relation to the handling of the 
risk of oil spills in [Nigeria].”120 
To make things even more complicated, the disputable status of the law 
increases the likelihood of similar future claims against MNEs, seeking to rely 
on documents issued by the corporations themselves which are available in the 
public domain.  Hopes have been raised that claims originally brought against 
subsidiaries may be brought before the courts of their parent companies’ home 
states and remedies may be sought in that jurisdiction.121  Although judgments 
in the Court of Appeal in two recent cases denied access to courts in parent 
companies’ home states for the victims of extraterritorial human rights 
violations, 122  the evidential value of public reports including sustainability 
                                                                        
 118. Id. at [71], [162]. 
 119. Owen & Bristow, supra note 116. 
 120. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [165] (Sales LJ).  Sales LJ also explained why judges 
tend to attach significance to public disclosure—it has evidently not been easy for claimants to find 
internal witnesses (from the defendant company) who were willing to act in a certain sense as 
whistleblowers. Id. at [168]. 
 121. Owen & Bistrow, supra note 116. 
 122. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191; AAA & Others v. Unilever PLC & Anor [2018] EWCA 
(Civ) 1532 (appeal taken from EWHC (QB)). 
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information was widely appreciated.123  It is likely that as long as the law is not 
completely clarified and the possibility of focal companies being dragged into 
lawsuits remains, MNEs will continue to be deterred from issuing detailed 
sustainability reports with details, since such hearings are costly in terms of both 
time and expenditure.  Lord Neuberger warned in VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek 
International Corp.124 about the risk of vexatious litigations if a hearing is 
expensive and time-consuming. 125   Unfortunately, the expenditure of time, 
effort, and financial resources in recent jurisdiction disputes has been significant, 
to the extent that they became “wholly self-defeating.”126   For instance, in 
Okpabi the total length of the witness statements ran to over 2,000 pages of 
material, and the parties’ ‘skeleton arguments’ ran to 259 pages.127  In Vedanta, 
the Supreme Court further warned against the disproportionate way in which 
these jurisdiction issues have been litigated, measured by the statistics about the 
materials placed before the Court.128  As summarized by Lord Briggs, “[t]he 
parties’ two written cases (ignoring annexes) ran to 294 pages.  The electronic 
bundles included 8,945 pages.  No less than 142 authorities were deployed, 
spread over 13 bundles, in relation to an appeal which, on final analysis, 
involved only one difficult point of law.”129  The cost and effort burdens on 
MNEs will incentivize them to avoid this type of litigation, and information 
disclosed in public documents which might be used as evidence against them 
will therefore be brief and concise.  Given that Section 54 of the MSA imposes 
no penalty for poor-quality disclosure, corporations that wish to avoid public 
disapproval are likely to disclose minimal or selective information in an indirect 
and non-confrontational manner, rather than straightforward opposition and 
failure to disclose.130 
                                                                        
 123. Okpabi 2018 EWCA (Civ) 191, at [62, 67, 153]; AAA & Others [2018] EWCA (Civ) 
1532, at [40]. 
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 130. See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10, at 8–10 (arguing that Section 54 of the U.K. 
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IV.  INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE 
A.  Structural and Compositional Intricacies of Supply Chains 
As well as its incompatibilities with regulatory approaches to extraterritorial 
tortious liability, Section 54 of the MSA is also restrained in practice by 
institutional barriers, not least the structural and compositional complications of 
supply chains.  Most of the supply chain and modern slavery literature 
concentrates on criminal behavior occurring in goods and services supply 
chains.131  Likewise, Section 54 in its current form does not distinguish between 
product supply chains and labor supply chains. 132   However, the complex 
channels of labor supply—contract employment agencies, local gang-masters, 
and the fact that they often provide people to work for a company without being 
counted as direct employees—tend to get around supply chain governance and 
labor standards, taking advantage of legislative ambiguity in the terms 
“supplier” and “employee.” 133   Under pressure to engage in responsible 
business practices, many companies spend vast sums of money on tracing the 
source of their products and making their product supply chains transparent.134  
However, the stark reality is that labor chains remain invisible for the most part.  
As shown by empirical evidence in the field, many businesses experience 
pragmatic difficulties in detecting modern slavery practices in their labor 
chains.135  The high structural volatility of global value chains has already been 
shown to have a significant impact on the actual operating effects of corporate 
policies, in some circumstances even rendering them unfit for purpose.136  In 
                                                                        
 131. Turner, supra note 16, at 205. 
 132. See generally Modern Slavery Act 2015, ch. 30, § 54 (UK). 
 133. New, supra note 18, at 4.  For instance, the precise conceptual boundaries of forced 
labour may vary, the radical view being that all workers under a capitalism regime are wage slaves.  
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 134. Thomas Wailgum, Supply Chain Spending on the Rise, CIO (Jan. 3, 2008), 
https://www.cio.com/article/2437386/supply-chain-spending-on-the-rise.html. 
 135. Andrew Crane & Genevieve LeBaron, Why Businesses Fail to Detect Modern Slavery, 
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the meantime, multi-tier supply chains, and the complex systems of transnational 
managerial control through which they operate, were ignored in the legislative 
drafting of Section 54, deliberately or otherwise.  If one takes a close look at 
the wording of Section 54 of the MSA, the term ‘supply chain’ is not clearly 
defined for the purpose of this provision, with the consequence that the scope of 
the suppliers covered by corporate policies and actions is not at all clear.137 
In this regard, a comparable provision—Section 1714.43(a)(1) of the 
Californian Civil Code—avoids confusion by clearly targeting a “direct supply 
chain for tangible goods offered for sale.”138  Some argue that  Section 54’s 
omission of the adjective “direct” implicates the U.K. legislators’ intention to 
accommodate a broader reach than the Californian peer.139  Indeed, practice has 
thus far supported the need to expand legislative reach; modern slavery problems 
frequently occur upstream at the less visible sub-supplier levels, rather than at 
the focal company or among the first-tier suppliers with whom a focal firm has 
direct contractual relationships.140  However, this is only scholarly speculation 
rather than an authoritative interpretation.  The enforceability of Section 54, at 
least at present, is significantly undermined by these conceptual and scope 
ambiguities.  As commented by O’Neill, proclamations about combating 
crimes including modern slavery without establishing or identifying institutions 
where corresponding claims for rights or redress may be lodged are, at best, “a 
premature rhetoric of rights (that) may have political point and impact . . . (and) 
at worst a rhetoric of rights (that) can inflate expectations while masking a lack 
of claimable entitlements.”141 
B.  Limits of the Focal Company in Sustainable Chain Management 
Behind the supply chain governance initiatives and the growing body of 
research suggesting that focal companies should expand their sustainability 
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 138. Turner, supra note 16, at 194. 
 139. Id. at 195. 
 140. J.L. Glover, D. Champion, K.J. Daniels & A.J.D. Dainty, An Institutional Theory 
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strategies to the sub-suppliers’ level142 lies another implicit assumption, which 
is that focal companies are able to affect or even manage their sub-suppliers’ 
practices.143  From the perspective of buying firms, this “chain liability”144 
effect demands that their sustainability management strategies penetrate as far 
as second-tier suppliers and even beyond.  This assumption should not be taken 
for granted, as the complexity of supply chains also affects the capacity and 
quality of sustainable supply chain management by the focal company.  To 
begin with, the lack of contractual relationships between a buying firm and its 
second-tier suppliers, coupled with asymmetric information on the exact number 
or identity of its sub-suppliers,145 often render the focal company’s practice of 
implementing sustainability strategies at sub-supplier levels difficult.  Focal 
companies are usually located in developed economies, whereas sub-suppliers 
are in emerging economies.  The multi-dimensional geographical, regulatory 
and cultural distances between a focal company and its sub-suppliers, combined 
with limited resource availability at the first-tier supplier’s level, which often 
serve as agent of the focal company, further compound the challenge of 
achieving sustainable goals in supply chains.146  Up to the present, managing 
sub-suppliers in the context of sustainability and human rights protection is still 
the exception rather than the norm, 147  and the extent of supply chain 
management also varies significantly, affected by power asymmetries as well as 
                                                                        
 142. E.g., Miriam Wilhelm, Constantin Blome, Ellen Wieck & Cheng Yong Xiao, 
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dependencies between supply chain members for critical resources or 
components.148 
Second, the strategies that focal companies use to manage sub-suppliers also 
differ significantly, ranging from delegating authority to tier 1 suppliers where 
there is no direct connection between the buying firm and the tier 2 supplier,149 
to working with third parties in extending sustainability to sub-suppliers,150 and 
to forming “closed triads” in which buying firms directly manage sub-
suppliers.151  The holistic implementation of practices beyond the boundaries 
of a buying firm is thus characterized by wide diversities in the focal company’s 
power, the industry in which the supply chain resides, the number and location 
of production facilities, infrastructural characteristics in transportation and 
telecommunications, the extent of public scrutiny, and the extent of dependency 
and distance between supply chain members, which will need to be taken into 
account in future law-making.152 
C.  Impacts of the General Socio-Economic Environment 
Other than the institutional complications of supply chains discussed above, 
the social complexities and dangers that might be involved in disclosing modern 
slavery in the global context may also deter efficient and full disclosure.  
Modern slavery, particularly in the form of human trafficking and forced labor, 
is a process rather than an isolated event, often involving the participation of 
criminal gangs who may use threats and various means of violence to prevent 
their crimes from being disclosed.153  Just as acutely noted by Quirk, “[modern 
slavery] does not denote a uniform condition, but covers a spectrum of practices, 
involving varying degrees of consent, coercion, treatment, and autonomy.”154  
Rather than seeing modern slavery as an exogenous problem that companies 
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have to address, it should be seen as an endemic feature of socio-economic 
systems that are sometimes partly constituted by the companies themselves.155  
Imposing disclosure obligations on companies without tackling the socio-
economic contexts in which modern slavery develops will not help much in fully 
eradicating the social ill. 
V.  DATA-BASED EVIDENCE 
Given the multi-faceted elements that interact with and disrupt the 
implementation of statutory disclosure requirements, it is unlikely that Section 
54 of the MSA will have a substantial effect in incentivizing focal companies to 
make detailed and accurate disclosure about their anti-slavery performance in 
supply chains.  This has been proved by empirical evidence.  Up to March 23, 
2020, of the 19,712 U.K. companies exceeding the £36 million annual turnover 
threshold, 156  just about half —10,517 companies—submitted reports to the 
Modern Slavery Registry, and only 23% of the submitted reports met all the 
minimum requirements set out in the MSA.157  If these disappointing figures 
can to a certain extent be excused by the fact that it is not mandatory to disclose 
on the Registry’s website, a closer look at the contents of MSA reports is just as 
unsatisfactory.  The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC) 
assessed the first year’s MSA Reports released by FTSE 100 companies, and 
concluded that “[while] there is a welcome cluster of leading companies taking 
robust action … the majority show a lacklustre response to the [MSA] at best.”158  
In other research targeting reports submitted by companies operating in sectors 
that are widely recognized as a heightened risk, almost two thirds did not make 
reference to the specific risks of slavery and human trafficking in relevant supply 
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chains or specific sectors.159  Without correct identification of the risks, it will 
be difficult for firms to take effective action to address those risks.  Many 
statements are not even compliant with the basic requirements of the legislation, 
with the majority failing to address the six topic areas listed in Section 54 in any 
detail.160  Indeed, viewed in the global context, firms tend to allege that they are 
against modern slavery and forbid their suppliers from engaging in it.  In many 
cases, firms assert that their prohibition must be cascaded down the chain of 
production, going beyond the first tier of supplying firms.  However, this kind 
of assertion tends to be restricted to the policy level—few companies thus far 
have disclosed their or their suppliers’ previous involvement in modern slavery, 
even if passive or unrecognized.161  Company policies also tend to be highly 
uniform and relatively abstract, revealing little information about their actual 
performance.  This has been described by Coombs and Halladay as a “pseudo-
panopticon.”162  The conventional corporate policy and monitoring regime has 
thus far proved only to provide room for manipulation and game-playing163 in 
responding to less challenging environmental issues in supply chains, not to 
mention dealing with the much more severe problem of modern slavery. 
VI.  SUGGESTIONS 
Although the ascription of responsibility has thus far primarily focused on 
group companies and depends on the individual circumstances in each case, 
including the nature, scope and extent of the holding company’s control, these 
legal developments still have significant implications for supply chain 
management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of agency and 
collateral contracts.  From the home state regulatory perspective, this requires 
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the acknowledgement of modern forms of corporate integration, so as to develop 
a coherent regulatory approach that defines the extent of the human rights 
responsibilities (accountability) of focal companies.  In order to solve the 
regulatory and institutional tensions discussed above, the experiences of several 
other jurisdictions might be of referential value to the U.K., both in reconciling 
corporate disclosure and other regulatory initiatives, and in enhancing the 
extraterritorial reach of home states towards their companies’ overseas supply 
chains, as explicated below. 
To begin with, eradicating modern slavery not only requires the improvement 
of regulatory standards in relation to disclosure, wages, working conditions and 
collective bargaining rights in both home and host countries, but also demands 
the effective detection of modern slavery in the first place.  Section 54 of the 
MSA does not dictate the content of corporate disclosures, instead merely 
providing guidance as to what information may be included in an organization’s 
slavery and human trafficking statement, 164  which enables corporations to 
formulate their statements in ways beneficial to them.  In this regard, the 
transparency required by the Californian Act seems to be more robust—each 
eligible retail seller or manufacturer must, at a minimum, disclose to what extent, 
if any, that he does each of the following: the verification of product supply 
chains to evaluate risks of slavery; conducting audits of suppliers to evaluate 
supplier compliance with corporate standards; requiring direct suppliers’ 
certification of material compliance; maintaining internal accountability 
standards for employees or contractors, as well as procedures for those who fail 
to meet the standards; and the provision of training for employees and managers 
who have direct responsibility for supply chain management.165  Of course, 
corporations can tick “no” to all the above questions, but then the disclosure 
statement will presumably become evidence in a name-and-shame exposure. 
Complex patterns of economic integration in contemporary groups and supply 
chains also consist of more than one form of bond—for example, ownership, 
authority and contract— which the law needs to take into full account in order 
to develop principles accordingly.  For instance, a repetitive pattern of 
contracting for essentially the same goods or services should suffice as evidence 
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of a significant degree of economic integration which may warrant a disclosure.  
Furthermore, this should not be limited to repetitive bilateral contracts, since 
multiple relations may operate in these massively integrated networks. 166  
Further clarification is also necessary in terms of sufficient degrees of proximity 
and control in the Caparo test, so that disclosure regulation would well integrate 
with the hard law duty of care.  In this regard, in France, disclosure of human 
rights protection activities has now become part of an integral framework of 
corporate duties that corporations must adhere to, rather than an isolated 
undertaking that corporations have the discretion to ignore.167  An amendment 
to the French Commercial Code creates an obligation for companies to prevent 
and mitigate environmental, health and human rights harms resulting from their 
activities, including those carried out by their subsidiaries and supply chains.168  
This duty is composed of three elements (stages), including “elaboration, 
disclosure and the effective implementation of a ‘vigilance plan,’”169 which 
should include “due diligence measures to identify risks and to prevent serious 
violations of human rights … health and safety and the environment.”170  In a 
corporate group, the duty could be imposed on the holding company to monitor 
and ensure that the vigilance plan is complied with within the sphere of 
influence.  Policies and measures to address extraterritorial challenges should 
appear in the vigilance plan in order to avoid unnecessary risks, including 
potential tort liability.  Good corporate practice of more information gathering 
and sharing would therefore not necessarily affect the arm’s length relationship 
between companies and their suppliers. 
Given their increasingly important role in global governance, a regulatory 
environment incentivizing MNEs to engage in self-observance and the effective 
governance of human rights in their extraterritorial activities will also be 
necessary, until such time as (and even after) MNEs become directly legally 
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accountable for their human rights abuses.  In this regard, the Illegal Logging 
Prohibition Act 2012 (ILP Act) in Australia provides a novel supplementary 
regulation mode. Instead of directly targeting wrongdoers who are engaged in 
illegal logging activities in a foreign jurisdiction and thereby risking accusations 
of the abuse of jurisdiction, the ILP Act provides “a mechanism for the 
prosecution of downstream activities ancillary to the illegal logging” (i.e., 
importation and processing).171  By reducing the markets for unlawful goods 
and services, this kind of “downstream regulatory scheme in developed states 
can indirectly strengthen compliance with the law in developing states” without 
risking accusations of cultural invasion172 and thereby reconciling relationships 
between home and host states in jointly tackling human rights abuses in global 
supply chains. 
In addition to more effective punishments or sanctions to deter non-disclosure 
or poor-quality disclosure, the creation of incentivizing structures within the law 
would also help.  For example, “public procurement guidelines based on 
corporate social responsibility standards”173 could potentially form the basis of 
incentivizing governance methods. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The “non-territorial spaces and management systems”174 of MNEs and the 
global regulatory gaps that spring from them have provided the impetus for 
intense academic and strategic attention, and a consequent range of regulatory 
attempts.  In transnational supply chains, “business entities are able to capitalize 
on the labor practices of contractors and suppliers in foreign states with whom 
they have an arm’s-length relationship.” 175   The opacity of supply chains 
further makes it possible to straddle a thin line between lawful employment and 
slavery or forced labor. 
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As global governance initiatives to encourage due diligence and combat 
exploitation in multinational supply chains proliferate, home state regulation of 
the global supply chains of corporations and the outsourcing activities of other 
multinational business entities is increasingly gaining momentum.  The U.K. 
has been a pioneer as regards global supply chain regulation and has made some 
commendable attempts—both in case law, which embodies a hard law duty of 
care owed by focal companies towards parties affected by their overseas 
subsidiaries, and in statutory requirements embedded in the MSA.  However, 
after an examination of the interactions between these regulatory methods, 
particularly the legal and institutional factors hindering companies from making 
detailed and substantial disclosures under Section 54 of the MSA, we have 
identified an urgent need for a more fine-grained and coherent regulatory 
framework, which can effectively reflect the volatile regulatory, normative, and 
cultural environments that global supply chains encompass.  Clear lines need to 
be drawn as regards a corporation’s sphere of accountability in the globalized 
context.  Furthermore, the statutory steering of CSR, particularly supply chain 
disclosure laws, should not be the major regulatory method to improve labor 
practices in transnational supply chains.  It should be part of a comprehensive 
strategy, within a framework that is designed to both incentivize supply chain 
sustainability and penalize business entities with supply chains that involve 
illicit labor practices.176  This will require coherent and compatible progression 
along several paths — extraterritorial jurisdiction, an extended duty of care for 
focal companies, and even downstream regulatory schemes, to name but a few. 
While home state regulation has to a certain extent offset the regulatory gap 
in international law by way of forming an “expanding web of liability,”177 the 
“geopolitical and geo-economic” tension implicated in regulating transnational 
business enterprises should not be overlooked.178   To end this institutional 
scourge and encompass MNEs within coherent home state and extraterritorial 
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regulatory regimes requires movements both at and beyond the regulatory level.  
For example, the complexity of institutional environments necessitates 
adaptations to “some of the most prominent features of the current world polity 
and economy:” the structural and compositional complications of global chains, 
national competition for markets and foreign investment, state sovereignty, 
coherence between human rights law and corporate law, the highly contested 
legitimacy of extraterritorial jurisdiction—the list goes on. 179   Indeed, as 
commented by Ruggie, while our hearts drive our instinct to eradicate modern 
slavery in supply chains, we still need our heads to develop suitable strategies to 
“steer the heart through the very difficult global terrain on which we are 
travelling.”180 
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